After reading some of the reports that come out of our military adventures, you begin to understand why politicians are so keen on keeping our defense arsenal bloated with missiles and bombs that can be used to simply blast an entire region to another dimension. We don't seem to be all that clever on the strategic side, nor all that disciplined on the ground work side.
Our "exit strategy" failure in Iraq isn't the only strategic failure we've experienced in the Middle East. We're obviously best at "shock and awe" battles. The problem we seem to be encountering is that the people who are supposed to be shocked and awed are just inflamed and reacting.
I've only just begun to read Hideous Dream, so expect some sharing. Early on, Goff's assessment of the military command seems to be that the reality of the situation takes a back seat to planning for honors and promotions (at least in this particular Haitian action - but I assume he's going to take that stance for all current action - see the title of his other book I've linked below). And the big issue, which permeates all government projects, and many private ones as well: public perception. "In the military, perceptions are always more important than facts. This mission would prove that beyond any doubt." (p 82)
Excerpts from the first chapters of Hideous Dream outlining strategic ineptitude:
Military planning doctrine is actually quite sound...
Once the executing commander determines what [the] desired end state is, he then carefully assesses the intelligence available to determine the enemy's capability, strength, disposition, morale and doctrine (if any), to make an educated guess about the enemy's probable courses of action...
With careful, objective appraisal of the war-gaming probabilities, one course of action shall always emerge as superior. That course of action is then analyzed to determine what the main effort of that action is to be, in order to prioritize available resources to that effort. And that main effort is analyzed to determine what is the key event that must succeed to ensure the satisfactory completion of that effort. That event is called the decisive point...
We were developing a plan like a board game with no rules....No mention was ever made of what the probable course of enemy action would be. No team or combination of teams was told, you are the main effort. No one had identified what could be called a decisive point. Setting up a roadblock two blocks away was given the same weight as entering the compound.
pp 54-55
Once the executing commander determines what [the] desired end state is, he then carefully assesses the intelligence available to determine the enemy's capability, strength, disposition, morale and doctrine (if any), to make an educated guess about the enemy's probable courses of action...
With careful, objective appraisal of the war-gaming probabilities, one course of action shall always emerge as superior. That course of action is then analyzed to determine what the main effort of that action is to be, in order to prioritize available resources to that effort. And that main effort is analyzed to determine what is the key event that must succeed to ensure the satisfactory completion of that effort. That event is called the decisive point...
We were developing a plan like a board game with no rules....No mention was ever made of what the probable course of enemy action would be. No team or combination of teams was told, you are the main effort. No one had identified what could be called a decisive point. Setting up a roadblock two blocks away was given the same weight as entering the compound.
No input was being accepted from the detachments. The communications security plan was cumbersome and overdone. We were treating the communications security threat as if we were faced off against the former Soviet Union, when the threat from Haitians was non-existent, and the chance of Cuban intervention based on intercepted traffic was about as probable as being struck by a comet.
Despite all the doctrine that exists to guide commanders toward realism in their assessments and priorities, we were still managing to overestimate the mouse turds and underestimate the mountains.
pp 78-79
Despite all the doctrine that exists to guide commanders toward realism in their assessments and priorities, we were still managing to overestimate the mouse turds and underestimate the mountains.
And here's a little precursor to the aerial photo evidence Colin Powell put before the UN to justify invading Iraq, evidence which turned out to be misinterpreted, and which had already been discounted by some intelligence experts who say aerial photography intelligence is nearly useless unless backed up by ground verification.
For the record, when we arrived in Fort Liberte, not a single shred of what this so-called, highly trained, professional military intelligence photo interpreter had told us was even approaching accurate...The truck he identified was apparently parked in the middle of a three-foot sidewalk with space to spare on each side. The six foot walls were 15 foot prison walls. Not only was there no vehicle storage in what turned out to be a quiet residential neighborhood, one would be hard pressed to find more than ten vehicles in the entire city of Fort Liberte on any given day. In a nutshell, like every bit of intelligence we would receive on this mission, it was horse shit.
pp 86-87
Oh, and maybe this helps explain what Dufus is talking about when he refers to brown-skinned people being able to self-govern (I keep wondering who in the world is saying they can't):
In August we received the one and only pre-deployment intelligence briefing on the nation of Haiti...To ensure we had a reliable source...our "Intelligence" guru selected an expatriate, white, American, fundamentalist preacher, who had been busy for the last eleven years in a community outside of Cap Haitian saving the heathen souls of some 300 Haitians who constituted his congregation.
...When he finished, I was near apoplectic. I could contain myself no more. So I raised my hand. The spotlight was mine.
"I have a real problem with the characterization of Aristide as a demon and Cedras as the savior of Haiti, given the reports coming out of Haiti about this regime. Doesn't it seem a bit arrogant for an American to judge the decision of almost 70 percent of the Haitian people who elected Mr. Aristide. After all, that would be an overwhelming landslide in American politics."
He replied that the election was a fraud perpetrated by Lavalas (the political coalition that supported Aristide), that the reports of violence by the Cedras regime were over-reported. Furthermore, he intimated, the childlike support of many Haitians for Aristide demonstrated that they were not yet ready for self-governance.
...Many of the mindless prejudices of the briefing would resurface later as official documents, from Intelligence, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs. It was part of the attempt to minimize American contact with Haitian realities. It went on throughout the mission whenever possible, and it was largely effective.
(pp 42-44)
...When he finished, I was near apoplectic. I could contain myself no more. So I raised my hand. The spotlight was mine.
"I have a real problem with the characterization of Aristide as a demon and Cedras as the savior of Haiti, given the reports coming out of Haiti about this regime. Doesn't it seem a bit arrogant for an American to judge the decision of almost 70 percent of the Haitian people who elected Mr. Aristide. After all, that would be an overwhelming landslide in American politics."
He replied that the election was a fraud perpetrated by Lavalas (the political coalition that supported Aristide), that the reports of violence by the Cedras regime were over-reported. Furthermore, he intimated, the childlike support of many Haitians for Aristide demonstrated that they were not yet ready for self-governance.
...Many of the mindless prejudices of the briefing would resurface later as official documents, from Intelligence, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs. It was part of the attempt to minimize American contact with Haitian realities. It went on throughout the mission whenever possible, and it was largely effective.
 Hideous Dream: A Soldier's Memoir of the US Invasion of Haiti |  Full Spectrum Disorder: The Military in the New American Century |
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