Progress or Peril?
Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction
September 2004
Executive Summary
Two months after the United States transferred sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, on June 28, 2004, Iraq remains embroiled in an insurgency, with security problems overshadowing other efforts to rebuild Iraq’s fragile society in the areas of governance and participation, economic opportunity, services, and social well-being. U.S. policymakers attempt to strike a balance between promising a U.S. exit strategy and promising to stay the course. Reports of gruesome violence compete with triumphalist descriptions of success in various areas.
Post-conflict reconstruction theory and practice have advanced considerably over the last few years, yet the U.S. government and the international community still lack forward-leaning, pragmatic, reliable models for measuring progress in post-conflict settings. Efforts to assess progress in Iraq have been lost in the midst of rumors on the one end and overblown lists of achievements on the other. The sources usually relied upon, from media to U.S. governmentgenerated, do not on their own tell a complete story, and often reflect underlying biases or weaknesses. The Iraqi voice has been a key missing ingredient in most discussions and assessments of Iraq’s reconstruction.
The Report
This report represents six months of research to measure the progress of reconstruction in Iraq according to an analysis of hundreds of data points drawn from 60 media sources, 17 public and official sources, 16 polls, and close to 400 interviews with Iraqis. We reviewed data from these sources covering the time period June 2003 through July 2004. Seven Iraqi researchers conducted interviews in 15 Iraqi cities from June 12-27, 2004. Because our research evaluated the information by source type, this report highlights trends in reporting according to different sources—e.g., whether the media is more negative than other sources—as well as particular trends in reporting in the different sectors we reviewed.
Conclusions
To narrow the gap between U.S. descriptions of successes in Iraq and Iraqis’ perceptions, the United States must do more than revamp its communications efforts to more persuasively describe its actions. It must calibrate those actions in light of Iraqi priorities and with a view to shoring up the fledgling Iraqi institutions in which the population has placed so much hope.156 Currently, those institutions lack the necessary capacity to make or sustain progress on their own, in terms of security, governance, justice, the economy, basic services, health, and education. With the possible exception of the Kurds, Iraqis generally dislike the continued presence of the U.S.-led military forces in their country; many consider the occupation to be ongoing despite the June 28 handover of sovereignty. The sentiment is caused by the mere fact of occupation, rather than by the particular qualities and experiences of this occupation—such as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison, civilian deaths, or cultural insensitivity—although those factors certainly exacerbate it. As such, the United States should expect continuing resentment and disaffection even if the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts seem to be making positive, incremental improvements to the country according to various quantifiable measures. In other words, the occupation will not be judged by the sum of its consequences, but rather qua occupation. Put simply, Iraqi pride in national sovereignty is a more deeply rooted sentiment than the United States anticipated.
It is possible to recognize progress in certain areas (e.g., number of hospitals rebuilt) while also concluding that it is insufficient, overshadowed by massive remaining hurdles, or not making a quantified or qualified difference to Iraqis. The U.S. efforts thus far have been largely divorced from the Iraqi voice and undermined by security problems and the lack of jobs, and they are not leading toward entrenched sustainability of Iraqi capacity. They are also not leading to positive trend lines across the sectors. Metrics that focus too heavily on quantifiable inputs do not tell a complete story. Moreover, U.S.-driven metrics and U.S. government propaganda are not trusted sources of information in Iraq. As rosy as they are, they do not make a dent in changing Iraqis’ perceptions. Until we start to see a positive trend line and arrive at a point (i.e., the tipping point) where Iraqis can sustain that trend, it is too early to claim success, and too risky to try to define circumstances that would justify an exit.
(pdf)
Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction
September 2004
Executive Summary
Two months after the United States transferred sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, on June 28, 2004, Iraq remains embroiled in an insurgency, with security problems overshadowing other efforts to rebuild Iraq’s fragile society in the areas of governance and participation, economic opportunity, services, and social well-being. U.S. policymakers attempt to strike a balance between promising a U.S. exit strategy and promising to stay the course. Reports of gruesome violence compete with triumphalist descriptions of success in various areas.
Post-conflict reconstruction theory and practice have advanced considerably over the last few years, yet the U.S. government and the international community still lack forward-leaning, pragmatic, reliable models for measuring progress in post-conflict settings. Efforts to assess progress in Iraq have been lost in the midst of rumors on the one end and overblown lists of achievements on the other. The sources usually relied upon, from media to U.S. governmentgenerated, do not on their own tell a complete story, and often reflect underlying biases or weaknesses. The Iraqi voice has been a key missing ingredient in most discussions and assessments of Iraq’s reconstruction.
The Report
This report represents six months of research to measure the progress of reconstruction in Iraq according to an analysis of hundreds of data points drawn from 60 media sources, 17 public and official sources, 16 polls, and close to 400 interviews with Iraqis. We reviewed data from these sources covering the time period June 2003 through July 2004. Seven Iraqi researchers conducted interviews in 15 Iraqi cities from June 12-27, 2004. Because our research evaluated the information by source type, this report highlights trends in reporting according to different sources—e.g., whether the media is more negative than other sources—as well as particular trends in reporting in the different sectors we reviewed.
Conclusions
To narrow the gap between U.S. descriptions of successes in Iraq and Iraqis’ perceptions, the United States must do more than revamp its communications efforts to more persuasively describe its actions. It must calibrate those actions in light of Iraqi priorities and with a view to shoring up the fledgling Iraqi institutions in which the population has placed so much hope.156 Currently, those institutions lack the necessary capacity to make or sustain progress on their own, in terms of security, governance, justice, the economy, basic services, health, and education. With the possible exception of the Kurds, Iraqis generally dislike the continued presence of the U.S.-led military forces in their country; many consider the occupation to be ongoing despite the June 28 handover of sovereignty. The sentiment is caused by the mere fact of occupation, rather than by the particular qualities and experiences of this occupation—such as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison, civilian deaths, or cultural insensitivity—although those factors certainly exacerbate it. As such, the United States should expect continuing resentment and disaffection even if the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts seem to be making positive, incremental improvements to the country according to various quantifiable measures. In other words, the occupation will not be judged by the sum of its consequences, but rather qua occupation. Put simply, Iraqi pride in national sovereignty is a more deeply rooted sentiment than the United States anticipated.
It is possible to recognize progress in certain areas (e.g., number of hospitals rebuilt) while also concluding that it is insufficient, overshadowed by massive remaining hurdles, or not making a quantified or qualified difference to Iraqis. The U.S. efforts thus far have been largely divorced from the Iraqi voice and undermined by security problems and the lack of jobs, and they are not leading toward entrenched sustainability of Iraqi capacity. They are also not leading to positive trend lines across the sectors. Metrics that focus too heavily on quantifiable inputs do not tell a complete story. Moreover, U.S.-driven metrics and U.S. government propaganda are not trusted sources of information in Iraq. As rosy as they are, they do not make a dent in changing Iraqis’ perceptions. Until we start to see a positive trend line and arrive at a point (i.e., the tipping point) where Iraqis can sustain that trend, it is too early to claim success, and too risky to try to define circumstances that would justify an exit.
As for the Kurds, if there isn't some resolution to the Turk/Kurd fighting, the effects may spill over into Iraq's Kurd population. What will the U.S. role be then? And how will the Kurds view the U.S. if we are drawn into battles there? Or maybe it's the other way round. Maybe the Iraq conflict, if not resolved soon, will engulf the Iraqi Kurds and spill over onto the Turk/Kurd situation.
Well, anyway, that's the horse before the cart, although it would be highly unlike us not to already be involved in some capacity. And it's a possible complication to the already apparently unresolvable mess we're in.
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