Saturday, June 19, 2004

Iraq as the 51st State

Asia Online interview with Juan Cole.

Excerpt:

JC: One of the reasons for getting rid of the Ba'ath army, according to Garner, was that they were afraid that the survival of any large Ba'ath institution like that might be an obstacle to the extreme liberalization of the economy.... They [the Americans] thought that the army would remain a power center able to intervene in policy debates, on the side of state control of the economy. So they dissolved it not based on security purposes, but to remove a potential obstacle to Polish-style shock therapy. They brought Polish economic advisers - that's the reason for the Polish military involvement in Iraq. They tried to replicate the Polish experience. I don't believe that the neo-cons at the Defense Department wanted to use the US military to supplant the Iraqi army. In fact, [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz had told Congress that it's likely the US would be back to having only one division in Iraq by October 2003. They thought they could dissolve the army and just use the police to maintain order, and then they could do whatever they wanted to do with the economy: sell it off, bring in the big companies, open Iraq to Western investment. They hoped that the Iraqi bourgeoisie would emerge, there would be productivity gains, the country would be rich, and everybody else - the Iranians, the Syrians - would want to follow them.

ATol: Was that a mix of arrogance and incompetence, plus lack of knowledge of society and culture in Iraqi and the Middle East?

JC: Certainly the plan was born out of enormous ignorance of the Middle East. Remember, people with training in economics and political science very frequently stay away from knowing details. They have a set of principles, they think they are physicists, so the people planning this out, most of them knew no Arabic or anything really about the history and culture and society of the Arab world. Except for Wolfowitz, who had some knowledge of Indonesia when he was there as an ambassador ...

ATol: But Islam in Indonesia and Southeast Asia has very little to do with Islam in the Middle East.

JC: I would say it's very substantially different. And Indonesia is not a sufficient background for planning out how to run Iraq ... And moreover Wolfowitz was the only one amongst them who had this kind of knowledge. So it's clear to me that first of all they were very ignorant, also extremely arrogant because they were playing with people's destinies. Some of the neo-cons of course are very close to the Likud Party in Israel, and I think that many of them have imbibed this kind of Israeli racism towards Arabs, that Arabs only respect force, that you can get them to inform on each other because of all the internal clan feuds ... People like Douglas Feith and Richard Perle have thought along these lines for a long time. Frankly, Israeli racism towards the Arabs is not a good guide to dealing with a society like Iraq, or with any society. Unlike the Palestinians, Iraq is a society that has not been dominated by a foreign power since 1932.

ATol: And the Iraqis expelled the British.

JC: The British were expelled and very decisively, in 1958. And there were many rebellions before that. This generation of young Iraqis grew up in Ba'ath schools, learning about nationalism, learning about anti-colonialism. What their identity really is about is asserting themselves vis-a-vis the West. The idea that they would be supine before a Western occupation was always crazy, and any of us who knew anything about the region predicted there would be a lot of trouble. Iraq was a modern, industrial society, with relatively high rates of literacy, run down in the 1990s very substantially but still not a society easy for foreigners to come and dominate.

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