Italy disagrees with the US finding in the Sgrena case

Imagine that. (Last post for background.)

In its summary, the American report concluded that Ms Sgrena's rescue car failed to slow down at the checkpoint and, secondly, that the Italians did not communicate their hostage mission to the American authorities on the ground.

In contrast, the Italian report is expected to rule that the American control centre was informed of the operation several hours in advance, and was told of the successful hostage release 25 minutes before Calipari was killed.

The Italian report is also expected to argue that the rapid removal of evidence from the site of the shooting made a proper inspection impossible.

[...]

In a further twist, a declassified version of the American report was removed from a United States military website today after the Italian newspaper Repubblica informed its readers that the censored text - which included the names and ranks of the individual soldiers at the checkpoint and their units - could be revealed by simply cutting and pasting the full document into a word processor.

Some of the material that had been blacked out in the 42-page document discussed training for checkpoint duty and checkpoint procedures. Other parts listed the number of attacks over recent months on the road to Baghdad airport, the techniques used by insurgents to plant explosives on the route and methods used by the American military to counter these.

[...]

Richard Owen, The Times's correspondent in Rome, said: "Berlusconi is between a rock and a hard place on this issue. He's caught between Italian national pride which he has made a feature of his own time in power, and his alliance with America which is the bedrock of his foreign policy.

"He has tried hard to find a compromise and there clearly is not one, meaning he has had to come down on the side of the popular Italian feeling. He is already in a very difficult spot politically and has had to re-form his government after heavy losses in the regional elections. Now he has an eye on the forthcoming general election and knows he has to follow the popular mood."

  Times Online article

The redacted U.S. report:

A Greek medical student at Bologna university surfing the web on Sunday found he could restore censored portions of the 40-page US report with a couple of clicks of his computer mouse.

He passed the details to Italian newspapers, which put out the full text on their websites.

The apparently full text contains a few details that US authorities would have preferred to remain secret - such as the names and ranks of the US military personnel involved in Calipari's death - the BBC's David Willey says from Rome.

Our correspondent adds that the censored material also includes embarrassing details about communication failures and reveals the rules of engagement at checkpoints.

  BBC article

THERE'S AN INTERESTING document on the Interweb. It's a declassified US military report into the killing of Italian military intelligence agent, Dr. Nicola Calipari, by US soldiers as he accompanied journalist Giuliana Sgrena to Baghdad International Airport in March.

Italian newspaper Repubblica has posted a copy of the pdf here. The original was on a US military website but was removed after the newspaper showed that all you have to do is copy and paste from the pdf to read all the bits that seem to have been struck out by the censors' black pen.

  Inquirer article

This is a problem with pdf formatting - unless newer versions have taken care of it. I can't recall just what embarrassing document the government released in the same manner not too long ago (maybe a year or two) and got busted, but you'd think they would have learned.

Oh yeah, we're talking about the government.

Of course, you can count on Memory Blog to have the unredacted version of the heavily redacted military offering.

I don't know what the legal parameters are for reprinting government redacted material, but I know Memory Blog has dealt with it all. I'm not set up to deal with it myself, so even though it would seem to me that this being an unclassified document there shouldn't be any problem with reprinting the redacted parts (which is most of the document), I'll just paraphrase anything that was blacked out.

You might be interested in knowing that the redacted information contains the number of attacks against the coalition forces in the Baghdad area from November 1 to March 12, 2005. Lots. About 18 per day. In the Baghdad area alone.

Much of the report details all the attacks that happen on the road to the airport (Route Irish), particularly in the area of the checkpoint in question, and all the danger the soldiers are exposed to there. And most of that is blacked out.

The military redacted the part about “IED Alley” - Route Irish, aka “the deadliest road in Iraq” being the only route available, which seems odd since that's common knowledge (and it's certainly not like the "insurgents" don't know route availability in their own country). Odd until you get to the last half of the report which lays the blame on the driver of the Italian car for knowing his way around Baghdad but not having an alternative route. The redacted portion claims specifically that there is no alternative route. Still, the driver of the car is blamed for being excited and distracted and going too fast.

They've redacted all the information about types of check points and how each type is operated, which speaks to the activity of the soldiers at the incident.

They've redacted the types of explosive devices used by the Iraqis. So you don't get any ideas, I guess.

They've redacted the number of attacks and casualties. So you don't know how bad things really are.

The first half of the report deals only with the rules of engagement at checkpoints and recommends adjusting them, making sure soldiers understand them.

According to the report, the command to man the blocking position because a VIP convoy was to use the road was not rescinded, even after it was no longer necessary, because no one communicated the order to the soldiers on duty. The report lamely claims it was due to a sudden problem with the communication linkage, simultaneously admitting that there was another method available for communication. So, even though the convoy for which the temporary checkpoint was supposedly set up never took place, the checkpoint was kept in place until the Italians arrived.

The report makes it seem like a rather lackadaisical affair in the line of communication. Kind of interesting since just prior to the conclusion that a lapse in communications was responsible for the checkpoint soldiers to still be manning a temporary blocking position, the report makes mention of the commander of the checkpoint soldiers making several requests to send the soldiers back on their regular patrol, and being denied permission each time because the convoy had not yet passed - five such communications were noted at 2010, 2014, 2015, 2020, and 2030 hours. (2030 hours is the approximate time of the Italians collecting the hostage.) You'd think that whoever he was requesting permission from would have gotten the idea that the man was eager to send his men back on patrol and make sure to let him know when it was okay to do so.

I got lost on who was unable to communicate with whom through what means. At any rate, according to the report, it appears there was no attempt to use the alternative communication link, and, according to the report, no further information was passed through the chain of command.

Here's another interesting bit.

(U) [The driver] reacted by saying into the phone, “they are attacking us,” not knowing who was shooting at him. [...] He stepped on the brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and dropped the phone.

I'd think if he thought it were someone intending to kill them (such as "insurgents"), he'd floor it, rather than brake.

(U) Once the car came to a stop, [the driver] got out of the car with his hands raised, cell phone in one hand, and told the Soldiers that he was from the Italian Embassy.

Yeah, obviously knowing who was shooting at them.

(U) [The driver] told Sergeant First Class xxxxxxxxx who Ms. Sgrena was and that he was trying to get to the airport. He told Sergeant First Class xxxxxxxxx that he heard shots from somewhere, and that he panicked and started speeding, trying to get to the airport as quickly as possible.

That sounds like there were some shots fired before the warning spotlights came on.

(U) The incident was reported through command channels, and the Commanding General [...] ordered an immediate commander’s inquiry/preliminary investigation into the incident.

This happened at about 2050 hours. So, in however long it took to happen, apparently, the non-working communication lines through channels became open again.

Before the investigator had arrived on the scene, the HMMWVs involved in the incident had departed to the CSH and the car had been moved in an effort to clean up the site so that the on-ramp could be re-opened. The Commander [...] arrived about two hours after the incident and ordered the car be put back in its stopped position to support the commander’s inquiry as much as possible.

[...]

The security situation at the incident site prevented examiners from visiting the scene.

[...]

(U) Photographs of the incident scene were taken in the hours after the incident by Combat Camera personnel, as advised by CID personnel.

I'm not sure how to reconcile all that - an investigator at the scene, the car being returned, and the statement that security prevented examination on the scene. At any rate, regardless of the fact that the car and the soldiers' vehicles had all been moved before any forensic investigation a week later, the military had specific locations and distances recorded of just where all the vehicles in the incident started and ended up.

(U) ³ The position of the Toyota was determined from photographs taken before it was moved during cleanup efforts. The blocking vehicle location comes from GPS readings provided by the Preliminary Investigating Officer based on witness statements regarding its position at the time of the incident.

[...]

(U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal from the scene.

And the Italian government was denied access to it until just a few days ago.

In the end, the fault, according to the report, lies with the driver of the car...

(U) [The driver] was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by the Soldiers that evening. He failed to stop for the spotlight since he was not expecting a roadblock. Additionally, he was dealing with multiple distractions including talking on the phone while driving, the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen for threats, driving on a wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need to get to the airport, and the excited and tense atmosphere in the car. [...] Any one of these would have affected his reaction time.

And, why the recommendations for signage and such are redacted, I am not getting even a clue, but they include such things as public awareness campaigns with pamphlets and signs written in Arabic and English with symbols; highly visible warning signs for roadblocks and checkpoints; hand-held signs instead of hand signals; rotating warning lights and sirens instead of spotlights; and tire puncture strips.

Amazing what you can come up with when you put your mind to it, eh?

....but hey, do what you want....you will anyway.